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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BUSINESS EXPENSES, DISALLOWANCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY: SOME PROBLEMS OF SANCTIONING
WITH THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
IN responding to the question of whether a penalty incurred in the conduct of a business
could be treated as an expense for income tax purposes, Scrutton, L.J., stated:
I confess that to the question so stated it seems to me that the obvious answer is
"Of course he cannot." But as Lord MacNaughten once said in the House of
Lords, the clearer a proposition is the more difficult it often is to find authority in
support of it; and when one comes to state the reasons why that obvious answer
should be given, perhaps it is not so easy as saying "Of course he cannot."
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Aletander von Glchn & Co., [1920] 2 K.B. 553, 571.
It has long been established that most business expenses or losses that them-
selves contravene state or federal regulatory or penal statutes or which re-
sult from such violations are not deductible under the business expense pro-
vion or other sections of the Internal Revenue Code.' Toward the end of the
The Editors of the Journal express their appreciation to Mr. Jan Deutsch, LL.B. 1962,
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1. For a summary of cases, see Lurie, Deductibility of "Illegal" Expenses, N.Y.U.
11Tl INST. ON FED. TAX. 1189 (1953) and 4 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL IN OmE TAXATION
§§ 25.50-.54, 25.131-.136 (1960).
The application of the public policy doctrine to income tax deductions probably originated
in England in Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Warnes & Co., (19191 2 K.B. 444. Apparently
disallowance first appeared in federal tax cases during the 'twenties. See, c.g., Great Northern
Ry. Co., 8 B.T.A. 225, aff'd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855 (1930) ;
Columbus Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926). An early dictum of the Supreme Court has had
a profound influence on allowance of deductions. In reply to the allegation that a deduction
should be had for bribery if claimed by an illegal business, Justice Holmes remarked,
"[I]t will be time enough to consider the question when a taxpayer has the temerity to raise
it." United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927).
Most expenditures have been disallowed under the business expense provision, § 162 of
the Internal Revenue Code, which allows deduction of all the "ordinary and necessary"
expenses incurred in a trade or business. Although the "ordinary and necessary" language
has provided a convenient hook for nondeductibility of business expenditures, the absence of
this language in the business loss provision, § 165, has not prevented disallowance on the
ground of public policy. See, e.g., Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S.
384 (1930) (denying deduction of losses resulting from adoption of prohibition amendment) -
United States v. Algemene Kunstzijde Unie, N.V., 226 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1955) (confisca-
tion of property seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act not a loss within purview
of income tax statute) ; G.E. Fuller, 20 T.C. 308 (1953), aff'd, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir.
1954) ; Nicholas D. Wusich, 35 T.C. 279 (1960). But cf. Bromberg v. Edwards, 48 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 1716 (M.D. Ga. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956), in which the district
court, allowing the deduction of a loss from a theft where the taxpayer sent monies to a
swindler who was allegedly betting on fixed races, observed that "there is no provision in
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1958 term, the Supreme Court on the same day handed down three decisions
on the public policy exception to income tax deductibility of business expendi-
tures.2 The importance of these decisions is due only partially to the fact that,
in an area involving large numbers of both taxpayers and dollars, Supreme
Court decisions were conspicuous by their absence.3 Equally important were
considerations stemming from the state of the law as it had been evolved in
the decisions of lower courts and administrative agencies. It may be received
learning that the path of the common law resembles rather the gnarled oak
than the dean lines of a Brancusi sculpture. In the field of the public policy
exception, however, even the outlines of the trees had been lost to view as the
result of unchecked proliferation of obscure distinctions.4
section 23 (e) (3) [now § 165] of the Internal Revenue Code which would permit disallow-
ance of a deduction on the ground that its allowance would frustrate public policy." 48 Am.
Fed. Tax R. at 1717.
2. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) ; Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) ; Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. United States, 356 U.S.
38 (1958).
The Court did, however, deny a deduction for amounts spent to induce legislation on
behalf of enemy aliens in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326
(1941). Treasury Regulations have long established that expenditures are not deductible
as business expenses if incurred or paid for lobbying purposes, promotion or defeat of legisla-
tion, or political purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1) (1959).
Disallowance of political expenditures has not been based on the general public policy
exception to the Internal Revenue Code, but upon the existence of the Treasury Regulation.
See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959). In addition, non-deductibility of
such expenditures raises problems that are distinct from those presented by disallowance of
unlawful and immoral expenses. Accordingly, such disallowance will not be discussed in
this Comment. For an able discussion of political expenditures and Treasury policy, see
Deducting Bisihess Expenses Designed to Influence Governmental Policy As "Ordinary
and Necessary": Camnmarano v. United States and a Bit Beyond, 69 YALE L.J. 1017 (1960),
and Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incentives for Small Contributors, 18 LA.
L. REv. 414 (1958).
3. Before these decisions, the Court had decided only two cases involving disallowance
on the ground of public policy: Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), and Lilly v.
Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). These cases involved attorney fees and lawful, though
ethically questionable, kickbacks to eye doctors. Although conflicts abounded among the
circuits on such items as fines and penalties and sundry illegal expenditures, the Court did
not pass upon these items until 1958.
The Court, in Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930), dis-
allowed a deduction of a business loss resulting from the adoption of the prohibition amend-
ment. Though consistent with the public policy doctrine in spirit, because such losses were
widespread and a result of a constitutional amendment, this decision has not been viewed as
one based upon the broad public policy exception to the Internal Revenue Code.
4. Compare F. L. Bateman, 34 B.T.A. 351 (1936), and Fairmont Creamery Corp. v.
Commissioner, 89 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1937), with Easton Tractor & Equip. Co., 35 B.T.A.
189 (1936); Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935), with Standard Oil Co.
of Indiana v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 688 (1942). See
also Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Commissioner v. Longhorn
Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); Huff,
Andrews & Thomas, 1 B.T.A. 542 (1925); I.T. 3530, 1942-1 Csm Bun. 43; I.T. 3762,
1945 Cum. BuL. 95; I.T. 3627, 1943 Cum. BuL. 111.
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Thus, for example, legal expenses and punitive damages incurred in a "pri-
vate" tort action based upon fraud, malicious prosecution, or breach of a
fiduciary duty, have been allowed as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses.5 Any moneys paid to the federal or state government, however,
whether by virtue of a willful, negligent, or inadvertent violation of a statute
or of a tort against the government, are generally denied deduction. But some
governmental "penalties" may be deducted, depending on the circumstances of
a particular violation,7 on the purpose of the statute under which they are in-
curred,s or, on whether the court hearing the tax controversy disagrees with
the policy of the statute that has been violated.9 And counsel fees and court
costs incurred in defense of all criminal prosecutions have been held non-de-
ductible business expenses if the outcome is adverse to the taxpayer ;1o the same
expenses, however, have been allowed, even if the taxpayer's defense is un-
successful,11 where the government chooses to prosecute civilly instead of
criminally against the identical business activities. And although many of the
expenses of a business entirely proscribed by state statutes are disallowed be-
cause the deductions would frustrate the policy of such statutes, the "legiti-
mate" expenses of an illegal business, such as the rent, wages, and losses of a
gambling enterprise, have nevertheless been fully deductible.
12
The extent and complexity of this thicket created by the Treasury and
the courts is at least in part attributable to the absence of any statement in the
Code, in previous revenue acts, and in the Treasury regulations prohibiting the
deduction of business expenses on the ground that they contravene public policy
as expressed in federal or state statutes.18 Indeed, the Committee report accom-
5. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hampton, supra note 4; Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B.T.A. 467
(1931); Huff, Andrews & Thomas, supra note 4. See also I. T. 3762, 1945 Cum. BULL.
95; I. T. 3627, 1943 Cum. BuL.. 111; 1. T. 3412, 1940-2 CuM. BuLL. 174. But c. Vales-
Mullaly, Inc. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1942).
6. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 688 (1942) ; I. T. 3627, 1943 CuM. Buu.. 111. But see I. T. 3630, 1943
Cum. BuLL. 113; I. T. 3799, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL 56.
7. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) ; Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d
Cir. 1949) ; Rev. Rul. 54-204,1954-1 Cum. BULL. 49.
8. See Hoover Motor Exp. Co. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 818, 823 (M.D. Tenn,
1955), aff'd on other grounds, 241 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1957).
9. See, e.g., Keystone Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 561 (3rd Cir. 1959).
10. See, e.g., Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958); Helvering v.
Superior Wines & Liquors, 134 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C.
801 (1947). But cf. G.C.M. 24377, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 93. But see Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C,
314 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F2d- 94 (5th Cir. 1956).
11. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Commissioner v.
Schapiro, 278 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960). Cf. Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 ($th Cir.
1956) ; G.C.M. 24810, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 55.
12. See, e.g., Doyle v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Comeaux v. Com-
missioner, 10 T.C. 201, aff'd on other grounds sub nom Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394
(10th Cir. 1949). But see Albert D. McGrath, 27 T.C. 117 (1956).
13. Cf. Bromberg v. Edwards, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1716 (M.D. Ga. 1955), aff'd, 232
F.24 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
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panying the 1913 Revenue Act specifically rejected a proposal to limit losses
and deductions to those incurred in a legitimate or lawful trade.14 This position
was reaffirmed in 1951 when Congress rejected Senator Kefauver's proposal
for disallowing deductions under section 162 "for any expense paid or incurred
in or as a result of illegal wagering," on the ground that the Internal Revenue
Code was not intended to penalize or prohibit unlawful activities; and in 1954
when Congress refused to enact the public policy provision drafted by the
American Law Institute.' 5 Furthermore, although Congress has re-enacted the
business expense provisions many times since the public policy gloss was added
in 1924, the argument that such re-enactments constitute congressional approv-
al is highly questionable, both because judicial interpretations have generally
been conflicting and because no single decision disallowing expenses had, prior
14. The object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say, what he has at the
end of the year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses. It is
not to reform men's moral characters; that is not the object of the bill at all. The
tax is not levied for the purpose of restraining people from betting on horse races or
upon "futures," but the tax is framed for the purpose of making a man pay upon his
net income, his actual profit during the year. The law does not care where he got
it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although the law may very properly care in
another way.
50 CO NG. REc. 3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams). See also SEumu , LGsILATIVE
ISTORY OF FFDERAL INcOmE TAx LAws, 1938-1961, at 994-97 (1938).
15. 97 CONG. REc. 12230-44 (1951) (debate on amendment proposed by Senator
Kefauver). Moreover, it was added that the income tax is based on the net income from a
business, not on its gross receipts, and that the constitutionality of a gross income tax on
gamblers would be dubious. Id. at 12244 (remarks of Senator George). The Kefauver
amendment was rejected in favor of the wagering tax, which, although obviously designed to
aid state law enforcement authorities, is not itself a repressive fiscal measure. NTv. REV. CoDE
OF 1954, §§ 4401-23. See United States v. Kahviger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
Before enactment of the 1954 Code, the American Law Institute drafted a statute de-
fining the concept of public policy as a bar to deductions ALI FED. INcoME TAx STAT. §
X 154(i) (May 1952 Draft). With a few ambiguities, the suggested provision Nas a rough
codification of the rules developed by the Treasury and the courts. See Comments, ALI FED.
INcomE TAX STAT. § X 154(i) 282-86 (May 1952 Draft). Congress, however, did not dis-
cuss the question in enacting the comprehensive revision of the tax laws in 1954. After the
Court's decision in Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), the Department of
Justice recommended a bill to Congress disallowing expenditures for rent, wages, or salaries
incurred or paid in violation of federal or state law. 46 CCH Taxes on Parade No. 25, Part
I, at 3 (June 3, 1959) ; H.R. 7394, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 105 CoNG. REc. 9167 (1959).
However, Congress again refused to add a public policy addendum to the business expense
provision of the Code.
In 1960 Congress added a provision to § 162 disallowing deduction of payments made
to officials or employees of foreign governments that violate the laws of the United States.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(3) (c) ; Treas. Reg. § 162-18, 2 CCH FED. TAx RFP. U 1398
(1962). This provision, although clearly a public policy exception to deductibility, does
not indicate congressional approval of the broad use of the public policy disallowance excep-
tion, or indeed, any use of the Code for sanctioning undesirable activities conducted in the
United States. Under the broad scope of the public policy doctrine judicially and administra-
tively engrafted on § 162, foreign payments that contravene domestic law could easily have
been disallowed without any further statutory authorization. Thus, this narrow authorization
1969-
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to 1954, received approval by the Supreme Court.10 In fact, the Court had in-
dicated possible reservations about the sweeping application of public policy
rationale in two cases allowing deduction of expenses challenged by the IRS.11
Undaunted by the lack of legislative authority, however, the Treasury early
discovered a mandate for extirpating evil in the words of the Code's business
expense provision, which, in disarmingly simple language, purports to allow as
deductions from gross income "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carring on any trade or business .... "is
of disallowance should not be read as an implicit congressional approval of the public policy
exception.
However, a committee report accompanying the 1962 Revenue Act indicates that the
Senate Finance Committee believes that the proposed amendment to the business expense
provision incorporates a public policy exception:
However nothing in your committee's bill is to be construed as allowing a de-
duction for any expense which is against public policy or which violates the public
conscience. Deducting an expense incurred for such purpose under the guise of
generating "business goodwill" will not be condoned and under your committee's
Amendment is not deductible.
108 CoNG. Rxc. 16843 (Aug. 28, 1962 daily ed.).
16. Although the Court did sanction disallowance in Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930), and its companion case, Renziehausen v. Lucas, 280 U.S.
387 (1930), these decisions have not been considered as public policy exceptions to de-
ductibility. See note 3 supra.
Distinctions as well as results have multiplied so rapidly that it was and indeed still is
difficult to determine the scope of the public policy exception at any given moment. For in-
stance, in 1950 the Tax Court found that wages and salaries of a gambling enterprise were
deductible. Doyle v. Commissioner, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1171 (1954), aff'd, 231 F.2d 635
(1956). A few years later the Tax Court held the same kind of expenditures violating the
same state laws not deductible, without attempting to distinguish or explain its reasons for
overruling its previous holding. Albert D. McGrath, 27 T.C. 117 (1956).
17. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952), and Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467 (1943). Even these decisions, moreover, did not clarify the boundaries of the doc-
trine. Compare the Treasury's interpretation of Heininger as allowing deduction of all at-
torney fees in civil litigation, and some criminal prosecutions, G.C.M. 24377, 1944 Cum.
BuLL 93, with Judge Hand's interpretation in Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175
F2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949) :
[I]f one rigorously applied the doctrine, a taxpayer could never deduct the payment of
fines and forfeitures; and we can see no relevant distinction between them and legal
expenses incurred in an unsuccessful effort to prevent their collection. Indeed, to hold
otherwise would be to subsidize the obduracy of those offenders who were unwilling to
pay without a contest and who therefore added impenitence to their offense; and
for this reason in the decisions just cited we held that such legal expenses were
never deductible. The Supreme Court overruled this doctrine in Commissioner v.
Heinninger [sic] ... ; and the question is as to the scope of that decision. It is possible
to read it as distinguishing between the legal expenses of an unsuccessful defence
[sic] and the payment of fines or forfeitures. On the other hand, it is also possible
to read it as meaning that, whether the claimed deduction be of legal expenses or of
fines or forfeitures, its allowance depends upon the place of sanctions in the scheme of
enforcement of the underlying act. We think that the second is the right reading...,
18. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 162. See also id. at § 212.
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The Treasury has argued that expenses incurred in nefarious activities can
never be "ordinary or necessary," since it is never "ordinary" or at least
"necessary" to violate the law in conducting a business.10 So stated, this reason-
ing seems hardly persuasive to an observer whose regard for the accepted
meanings of these terms remains unaffected by his desire to realize the good.20
19. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 11, Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
Cf. Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
20. Although the business expense provision has been a fertile source of litigation, the
difficulties arise primarily because the Code expressly disallows the deduction of personal
and capital expenditures. 4 MERTENS, LAW oF FEDERA. Ixcor TAxATroN, § 25.02 (1960).
Aside from the public policy exception, expenditures genuinely incurred by a taxpayer in
profit-seeklng activities are rarely disallowed because they are not "ordinary" or "necessary."
Since a strict construction of these terms would result in a tax on an amount that might
have been earned, and would place the courts and Commissioner in the position of business
efficiency experts reviewing the commercial decisions of the taxpayer, a function which they
are ill-fitted to perform, the courts have not given any precise content to these terms.
See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
Rather, a determination of whether a particular expense is "ordinary and necessary"
depends on the actual practices of businessmen. As stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo, the only
guides are "the ways of conduct and the forms of speech prevailing in the business world."
Id. at 115. Thus, an outlay is a business expense if it is directly connected with or has
proximately resulted from a taxpayer's acquisitive activities. E.g., Kornhauser v. United
States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928). An expense is "ordinary" if it is of common or frequent occur-
rence in the type of business involved, or if it is embraced within the normal overhead or
operating expenses of an enterprise. An expense is "necessary" if it is appropriate or helpful
to the business. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940) ; Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933) ; Commissioner v. People's Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1932) ;
Cannon Valley Milling Co., 44 B.T.A. 763 (1941); B. Manischewitz Co., 10 T.C. 1139
(1948). Under the present treatment of unlawful ex-penditures, the problem is often cast in
terms of whether the expenses are ordinary or necessary. When the Treasury disallows
penalties paid for an industry wide practice of violating burdensome maximum weight laws,
or even protection payments paid by a gambling establishment to avoid prosecutions, on the
ground that it is never "ordinary," or at least "necessary" to violate the law in conducting a
business, however, it is clear that the meaning of these terms is distorted to meet the de-
mands of the public policy rationale. It is the fact of illegality and not the ordinary criteria
of "ordinary and necessary"--whether such expenditures are generally incurred in the tax-
payer's type of business-that is determinative under the public policy rationale. Thus, ex-
penditures involved in the purchase of intoxicating liquors for business purposes are de-
ductible in all places, except in dry states. See Rev. Rul. 55-307, 1955-1 Cum. Bu.L. 22.
Some courts have recognized that disallowed expenses are often "ordinary and necessary"
in the generally established meaning of those terms. E.g., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v.
Commissioner, 47 F2d 178, 180 (2nd Cir. 1931) :
It might have been said in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, [8 B.T.A. 225,
af'd 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855 (1930)], that fines for
violations of regulations such as were there imposed are not infrequent, are inevitable
in any large railroad system, and for that reason may reasonably be allowed as
"ordinary and necessary" expenses of the business. It is not easy to distinguish such
fines from expenditures incurred in connection with actions to recover for negligence
or because of patent infringements, unless one draws an arbitrary line between
criminal and civil actions even where the criminal actions relate to matters involving
no moral turpitude. Undoubtedly expenditures which are in themselves immoral, such
19621
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
But the objections to the public policy exception run deeper than the resulting
disarray of cases and the torturing of the ordinary language of one of the few
Code sections which has thus far escaped the prolixity of the framers of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Disallowance of expenses actually incurred in the production of income,
regardless of its source, results in a tax on gross rather than net income and
is thus inconsistent with a Code geared to the latter concept. The conven-
tional response to this objection is the bromide that all deductions are a matter
of legislative grace and that income as defined in the Code is gross receipts less
those deductions allowed by Congress. Whatever its theoretical validity, how-
ever, this proposition cannot be sustained historically, since Congress has
never sought to impose the income tax on any amount greater than that com-
monly regarded as commercial net income.21 And congressional adherence to
the concept of net income was strikingly reaffirmed in 1942, with the passage
of section 212,22 which, by explicitly allowing a deduction for all the ordinary
and necessary expenses incurred in the production of income,23 overruled a
Supreme Court decision denying deductions for expenses incurred in business
as for bribery of public officials to secure protection of an unlawful business would
not have to be allowed in order consistently to justify a deduction of fines paid for
violations of law involving no moral turpitude and practically inevitable,
Indeed the Treasury and courts have conceded that some disallowed expenses are at
least "ordinary," while relying on the argument that violations of law are never "necessary."
Cf., National Outdoor Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Boyle,
Flag & Seamen, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955). But since "necessary" merely means helpful or pro-
fit seeking, not "necessary" in any absolute sense, the departure from this meaning is clear.
Although helpful, the statutory "hook" of "ordinary" and "necessary" has not proved in-
dispensable. See note 1 supra. But see Bromberg v. Edwards, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1716
(M.D. Ga. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
21. See Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Shonld be
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. Rv. 1142, 1147 (1943) :
Taxation on net, not on gross, income has always been the broad basic policy or our
income tax laws .... Net income may be defined as what remains out of gross income
after subtracting the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in efforts to obtain or
to keep it.
McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Black). See 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.03 (1960) and authorities
cited therein. Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. United States, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); CAUN,
PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1-16 (1960).
See generally, LABRiE, THE MEANING OF INCOME IN THE LAW OF INCOME TAX (1953).
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) (2), as amended by Revenue Act of 1942, § 121(a),
56 Stat. 819; INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 212. The congressional report accompanying tie
1942 bill indicates that Congress intended to broaden existing law and thereafter permit the
deduction of all the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the production of income re-
gardless of whether the expense was incurred in connection with the taxpayer's trade or
business. See H. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1942). See also Elsie B. Gale,
13 T.C. 661 (1949), aff'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951).
23. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941). See discussion in McDonald v. Com-
missioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
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activities that did not constitute a trade or business within the purview of
section 162. In fact, the very breadth and vagueness of the contours of 162,
together with the repeated refusals of Congress to incorporate a public policy
restriction on deduction of business expenses, may ultimately reflect a belief
that constitutional boundaries would be transgressed by a tax imposed on
gross income or gross receipts rather than net income.2-4
Admittedly the net income concept of tax liability has been modified to some
extent by other policies pursued by means of the revenue laws, such as inter-
personal equity among taxpayers, business incentives, and promotion of
charitable institutions. But in every case save one where Congress has sanc-
tioned departure from the net income standard,2 5 the tool employed has been
allowance rather than disallowance of expenditures. Thus, deductions for
medical expenses 26 and charitable contributions 27 reduce the tax base below
net income, and the lower capital gains 28 rates have a similar effect. Congress,
in other words, where it has attempted to further policies other than the
maximization of revenues, has invariably done so by decreasing rather than
increasing the tax base. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Code embodies con-
gressional approval of the use of revenue laws to sanction activities that violate
public policy, it not only represents a wholly sub silcutio policy declaration but
also an affirmative acceptance of means that are diametrically opposed to those
normally utilized in the Code to achieve social and economic objectives.
Aside from these basic objections, both the Treasury and the courts have
neither effectively defined the scope of the public policy doctrine nor revealed
intelligible criteria for its application. And, unfortunately, juxtaposition of the
three recent Supreme Court opinions fails to reveal the emergence of a
coherent rationale. Thus, in Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. United
24. The sixteenth amendment neither defines income nor confers or enlarges the taxing
power, but merely removes the necessity of apportioning income taxes. William . Peck &
Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 156 (1918). See Powell, Stock Dividcnds, Direct Taxes and the
Sixteenth; Amendment, 20 COLum. L. REv. 536 (1920).
Although the issue has not been resolved, some authority suggests that the term "income"
as used in the sixteenth amendment means net income, not gross income or gross receipts.
See Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Hofferbert v. Anderson Olds-
mobile Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948). But see
Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 704 (1937), holding
that losses on the sale of stock by an investor, not in the business of buying and selling
stock, belonged in the category of deductions that were a matter of legislative grace.
The constitutionality of a gross income tax was a concern of the opponents of the Kefau-
ver gambling tax proposal. See 97 CoxG. Rmc. 12239-45 (1951).
25. Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, ch. 275, § 104(i), 65 Stat. 136 (1951).
Penalties imposed for various forms of evasion of the income tax are not considered as
exceptions to the net income concept, since they are imposed to insure that the tax is in fact
based upon net income.
26. l x. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213.
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
28. Ixv. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 1201, 1202.
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States 2 9 and Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,0 fines were ruled
nondeductible because the state statutes which had been violated were taken
as expressions of public policy, while in Commissioner v. Sullivan,31 the ordi-
nary expenses of an illegal gambling enterprise were held to be deductible, al-
though the expenditures were in direct violation of state criminal statutes.
Were the problem posed by these decisions merely one of Euclidean symmetry,
the resultant confusions might elicit no more than bemused Socratic queries in
the academic halls where the arcane legal mysteries are explored. But the
problem is of considerably greater magnitude. For the Supreme Court's formu-
lation of the doctrine is the only standard available to taxpayers in deciding-
at the risk of civil or criminal sanctions-whether to deduct a particular ex-
penditure or not, to the Treasury in determining whether to challenge or
litigate a given deduction, and to the numerous tribunals that hear tax cases in
resolving controversies between taxpayers and the IRS.
This lack of a coherent rationale for the public policy exception may in
part be ascribed to the fact that distinct types of expenditures, despite their
inherent differences, are disallowed under the same rubric. Fines and payments
to the federal, state, or local governments for violations of statutes and ordin-
ances, certain legal fees, illegal expenditures, and the expenses of illegal
businesses are all indiscriminately relegated to the limbo of disallowance by
invocation of the public policy doctrine. In each case, the formulation of the
doctrine is the same: an expenditure, incurred in the course of a trade or
business, may not be deducted if allowance of the deduction "would frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of con-
duct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof." But the problems
presented by the various categories, although similar in some basic respects,
are by no means identical. As a result, separate consideration of each category
is a prerequisite to the formulation of a rational public policy toward income
tax deductiblity of these expenditures.
Fines and Penalties
Fines and penalties paid for violations of various federal and state statutes
have generally been held non-deductible. The Supreme Court did not rule on
the question until 1958, when, in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Cornnissioner,82
it unanimously held that fines paid by interstate motor carriers for violations
of state maximum weight laws were not deductible business expenses. A better
case for the commercial necessity of these expenditures could hardly have been
presented. The taxpayer, a trucking company, transported bulk liquids, such as
oil and gasoline, throughout many States along the Eastern seaboard. All of
those States imposed a uniform maximum weight of 60,000 pounds for vehicles
29. 356U.S. 38 (1958).
30. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). See Note, 43 CORNI.LL L.Q. 725 (1958).
31. 356 U.S.27 (1958).
32. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). See Note, 5 N.Y.L.F. 208 (1959); Note, 33 ST. JouN's L. Rlv.
150 (1958) ; Brown, The Supreme Court 1957 Term, 72 HA~v. L. REv. 77, 116 (1958).
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operating on its highways, except Pennsylvania, which had a substantially
lower limit. Because of the standardized equipment used in the industry, which
had to be fully loaded to operate both safely and profitably, the taxpayer, with
the rest of the industry, deliberately operated its trucks overweight in Pennsyl-
vania,33 paying fines whenever violations were detected. In unanimously hold-
ing that the fines paid by the taxpayer were not deductible business expenses,
the Court reaffirmed the traditional rationale for disallowance: although the
payment of fines and penalties is not in itself against public policy,34 allow%-ance
would benefit the taxpayer by remitting part of the sanction in the form of a
tax deduction, thus placing the federal government in the position of sub-
sidizing the taxpayer's violation.33 The rationale, however, is a curious one, for
it rests ultimately on the proposition that all of the taxpayer's income belongs
to the government, and that whatever the government does not retain is there-
by converted into a "subsidy" for the taxpayer.
It has been argued that since the Internal Revenue Code is not concerned
with the source of income, it should take a similar neutral attitude toward the
reduction of penalties. But the problem cannot be solved so easily. Whether
the income tax allows or disallows reduction of penalties, the content of the
sanction involved is altered. The question to date has been framed in terms of
whether deductions reduce the impact or "sting" of the penalty. But such an
argument fails to recognize that disallowance itself increases the burden of the
fine by the amount of the additional tax liability. The question to be answered
therefore is whether the income tax laws should be used to increase or decrease
the monetary sanctions imposed by statutes -which themselves say nothing
about whether they want additional penalties or not. Disallowance of penalties,
in other words, is not solely a matter of taxation, but also necessarily involves
the policy of the statute that has been violated.
Some courts, realizing that disallowance of fines and penalties amounts to an
additional sanction imposed without warrant of the primary statute which
created the offense and monetary sanction for its violation, have questioned
the presumption of increasing the penalty and decided the issue of deductibility
by looking to the nature of the taxpayer's conduct and the place of sanctions in
the scheme of enforcement of the primary statute.30 Jerry Rossnan Corp. v.
Commissioner 3 7 best illustrates this approach. The taxpayer in Rossman, upon
learning that he had unwittingly overcharged customers under the Emergency
Price Control Act, voluntarily reported his violation to the O.P.A. before being
investigated. Since the amount of overcharges could not be returned to ultimate
consumers, the Price Administrator ordered that this amount be paid to the
government and agreed not to claim the treble recovery available under the
33. 356 U.S. at 32.
34. Id. at 35.
35. E.g., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
36. See Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953) ; Jerry Rossman
Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949). Cf. Keystone Metal Co. v. Com-
missioner, 264 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1959), reversing 29 T.C. 1263 (1958).
37. 175 F.2d711 (2d Cir. 1949).
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act.38 The Second Circuit, per Judge Learned Hand, held the taxpayer's pay-
ment to the Government deductible on the ground that a deduction in these cir-
cumstances would not frustrate the policy of the Emergency Price Control Act.
The court, finding that the taxpayer had taken all practical precautions to
avoid violating the act and that the policy of the Administrator was to settle for
only the overcharge if the seller had acted in good faith,39 reasoned that in-
creasing or imposing an additional penalty on an inadvertent violator could
only be "justified by a Draconian School of Penology." 40 Other courts have
similarly sympathized with an unwary taxpayer confused by the maze of
regulations controlling his economic activities and allowed a deduction as a
recompense for his diligence. 41
Even if sympathy for the "innocent" taxpayer is well founded, the conduct
of the taxpayer in violating the primary statute and the fact of compromise or
settlement by the responsible authorities are unworkable criteria for reducing
or increasing the sanction. Settlement by the enforcement agency or court does
not necessarily mean that the violation was unavoidable or that the taxpayer has
used due care; more often it may reflect limitations on the time and personnel of
the primary authority.4 Proof of bad faith or want of due care is always dif-
ficult because the evidence is peculiarly available to the defendant. 43 More-
over, since some statutes are explicitly aimed at negligent or careless conduct,
violations arising out of indifference or carelessness under these statutes may
be more significant than willful ones.44 Similarly, voluntary disclosure of
violations does not prove inadvertence or that the offender took all practical
precautions. The violator may have confessed his sin only in the expectation of
obtaining a settlement for less than the full statutory penalty.45 The difficulties
38. Id. at 712.
39. Id. at 714.
40. Ibid.
41. E.g., Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953) ; National Brass
Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950); Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C,
464 (1956). Cf. Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) ; Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax
R 1630 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 240 F2d 759 (9th Cir. 1956). See Keystone Metal Co. v.
Commissioner, 264 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1959).
42. Schwenck, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by Adininistra.
tive Agencies, 42 MicH. L. REv. 51, 80-86 (1943) ; GELLHORN, ADniNISTRAT1V. LAW, CASMS
AND COMNMNTs 327-39 (2d ed. 1947).
43. Cf. PRoss, TORTS § 84, at 505-07 (2d ed. 1955).
44. "Violations arising out of carelessness or indifference may well be more important in
some situations than willful violations." Memorandum to OPA Regional Administrators
from Price Administrator Chester Bowles, Jan. 31, 1945.
Absolute liability is often imposed for volations of regulatory statutes not only beausge
of administrative convenience, but also because a purpose of the statute is to deter in-
advertent violations. See, e.g., Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911) ;
Fontes v. Porter, 156 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1946). See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Of-
fenses, 33 CoLm. L. Rzv. 55 (1933); Schwenck, upra note 42.
45. Cf. Jerry Rossman Corp., 10 T.C. 468, 472-73 (1948) ; Gelfand, Payments to OPA,
27 TxXEs 961 (1949). The Tax Court found that "it is not too clear from the evidence that
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inherent in the use of these criteria are compounded by the fact that the tax-
payer's conduct in violating a statute is being appraised many years later in a
tax proceeding. Furthermore, the numerous tribunals that hear tax cases and
the IRS are not the appropriate authorities to determine whether a taxpayer
has used good faith or due care in attempting to comply with the myriad of
federal, state, and municipal regulations and statutes controlling the activities
of businessmen.46
Another test suggested in Rossman is to base deductibility on the role of the
monetary sanctions in the enforcement of the primary statute.4 7 If this standard
means that deductibility is to turn on whether the sanctions employed by the
responsible authority do in fact deter violators, it would leave far too much dis-,
cretion to the Commissioner and tax courts; deductibility would vary vith the
decision-maker's views on deviation and deterrence, subjects on which there
is wide-spread disagreement. 48 If, on the other hand, the attempted distinction
is between those penalties which do in fact deter and those which are not
necessary to assure compliance, then the blanket presumption in favor of
disallowance under the present law-indulged in by judges less prone to fine
the overcharges in question might not have been avoided if the petitioner had adopted other
more appropriate accounting methods." 10 T.C. at 472. Moreover, the "unavoidable" viola-
tions involved overcharges of over tvo million dollars. Brief for Pacific Mills as Amicus
Curiae p. 1, Rossman v. Commissioner, 175 F2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
46. Congress seems to have given recognition to this view in the Defense Production
Act of 1950, as amended, ch. 275, § 104(i), 65 Stat. 136 (1951). After the experience vith
disallowance by the IRS and the tax courts under the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, 56 Stat. 23, Congress made disallowance of overcharges depend upon a determination
and certification by the appropriate economic stabilization agency charged with enforcement
of the D.P.A.
(a) The President shall also prescribe the extent to which any payment made, either
in money or property, by any person in violation of any such regulation, order,
or requirement shall be disregarded by the executive departments and other
governmental agencies in determining the costs or expenses of any such person
for the purposes of any other law or regulation, including bases for determining
gain for tax purposes.
Under Exec. Order No. 10161, 15 Fed. Reg. 6105 (1950), the President delegated
authority to the Administrator of the Economic Stabilization Agency to determine the extent
of a violation and to certify to the IRS the amount paid in violation of the Act. Gen. Order
No. 15, 17 Fed. Reg. 2994 (1952). Such amounts would then be disregarded in determining
the costs or expenses of a taxpayer for federal income tax purposes. Payments not certified
by the responsible agency are allowable deductions. Rev. Rul. 56-180, 1956-1 Cutu,. BULL.
94, amplifying I. T. 4105, 1952-2 Cumi. Bu. 93. Cf. Zehman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 876
(1957), aff'd mib nom. Solon Decorating Co. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1958).
For some inexplicable reason, this approach has not been extended to other federal or state
regulatory statutes.
47. 175 F.2d at 713.
48. See AxFss & LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER 25-60 (1961). Compare
DFssIoN, FINAL DRAFT OF THE CODE OF CORRECTION FoR PUERTO Rico §§ 3-6 at 71-96, re-
printed in 71 YALE L.J. 1050, 1064-75, 1117-29 (1962), With MODEL PENAL CoDE §§ 1.02,
6.01-6.12, 7.01, 7.08 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). Also see generally ELDR.=, NAnconcs AM
THE LAW (1962).
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distinctions than Judge Learned Hand-seems implicitly to answer the test
posed in Rossman by categorically assuming that additional penalties are al-
ways effective in assuring compliance.
A policy of allowance, moreover, is often said to be undesirable because de-
duction would affect violators unequally, with an obvious preference for tax-
payers in the high income brackets. The effect of disallowance, though also
unequal, with a preference for violators in low income brackets, is found un-
objectionable. This view assumes that the offender, whether rich or poor,
should feel the loss in approximately the same way. Whatever the inherent
merits of this penalogical theory, it cannot be justified by reference to the
policy of the primary statutes, since these statutes have no progressive system
of fines and penalties. In fact, the only policy expressed is that all violators,
regardless of wealth or income during a particular year, are to be treated
equally. And, the wisdom of progressive sanctioning, which necessarily re-
sults from disallowance of penalties, is questionable when applied to at least
some of the statutes regulating the acquisitive activities of the businessmen. Al-
though evidence is scant, studies of violations of price control and related statutes
have shown that voluntary compliance is more likely to occur among firms with
rising profits and that frequently the low profit firms establish a pattern of
noncompliance for the industry.49 If it is assumed that the marginal enterprise
is more likely to initiate noncompliance with some of the economic regulations
involved in tax cases, then the present policy of disallowance, in favoring the
low profit firms, would seem to be particularly inappropriate as a sanctioning
device.
The tax courts have avoided defining a "penalty" for purposes of disallow-
ance, but have been content to accept the labels given by the primary statute.
Thus, for example, some courts have extended the policy of disallowance to all
monetary exactions paid to the government, except those designated taxes.60
Where the sanctions of the primary statute involve payments to an individual
rather than the government, however, the tendency is to classify the payments
as "remedial" rather than "penal" and allow their deduction. 1 This verbalistic
distinction between private and public wrongs may produce some curious
results. For instance, because ultimate consumers had a private right of action,
persons who violated O.P.A regulations by overcharges to such consumers
were allowed to deduct amounts paid as treble damages ;u2 persons who sold
49. LANE, THE REGULATION OF BUSINESSMEN 90-95 (1954). The meat industry and
laundries are discussed in KATONA, PrIcE CONTROL AND BUSINESS 241 (1945). But see
CLINARD, THE BLACK MARIr: A STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR CRiME 313-26 (1952).
50. E.g., Bowles v. Commissioner, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 510 (1954) ; IT. 3627, 1943
Cum. BULL. 111, 112. See case cited note 6 supra; but cf. National Outdoor Advertising
Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937).
51. See Huff, Andrews & Thomas, 1 B.T.A. 542 (1925) ; I.T. 3762, 1945 Cum. BULL.
95; I.T. 3627, 1943 Cum. BULL. 111; I.T. 3412, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 174. But cf. Casey
O'Brien, 36 T.C. No. 98 (1961).
52. I.T. 3627, 1943 Cum. BULL. 111.
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to middlemen, however, were not permitted to deduct any amounts paid as
overcharges 5 3 because the statute left the power of enforcement in the federal
government. The same distinction has been used to differentiate betveen torts
against the government and those against private persons.5 4 Although in pri-
vate actions the community is involved only at the initiation of a party who
alleges an unlawful deprivation, considerations of deterrence, prevention, and
punishment do, in fact, enter into damage awards which take the nominal form
of a compensatory tort or contract remedy. The purpose of exemplary or
punitive damages, for example, is admittedly punishment rather than restitu-
tion 55 And, even so-called remedial payments in private actions, while in-
tended to be compensation to the deprived party, are also intended to prevent
further violations of the norms of public order5 0 Many payments to the
government, on the other hand, have their remedial as well as punitive aspects,
as, for instance, the fines involved in Tank Truck, which were to be used ex-
clusively for the repair and maintenance of the local highways,"1 and were only
sporadically imposed. In fact, at one time the IRS classified these payments as
tolls intended to compensate the State for damage done to the highway by
overweight motor carriers.5 8
The problem of determining whether a statute is "penal" or "remedial" can
perhaps best be seen in the arguments for and against deduction of payments
made by corporate officers and directors under section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act.5 9 Briefly, the purpose of section 16(b) is to "protect the inter-
ests of the public by preventing directors, officers and principal shareholders of
a corporation. . . from speculating in the stock [of such corporation] on the
basis of information not available to others." 0 In some respects, payments
made under section 16(b) appear to be a penalty for engaging in an unlawful
transaction. Thus, liability under the statute is not predicated upon damage
either to the corporation or to a shareholder but is imposed in the interest of
the public, in order to insure a fair and honest market by frustrating possible
use of inside information. 1 Liability is not dependent upon intent or conscious
53. Ibid.; I.T. 3799, 1946 Cum. BuLL. 56. But see Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
54. Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1942) ; David R. Faulk,
26 T.C. 948 (1956). See Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
55. McComacx, DAmAGEs 275 (1935).
56. ARENS & LAsswEL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBiC ORDER 231-32 (1961). This is especially
true where enforcement by means of monetary sanctions is implemented predominantly by
private damage suits, as in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (1958). Except for the rarely invoked criminal sanction for willful violation,
penal enforcement takes the form of double damage suits by injured employees. 52 Stat.
1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1958).
57. As amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1301 (1960).
58. 1956 A.xNuAL. TAx FORTNIGHTER 598.
59. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
60. S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
61. See Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Offlcers and Stockholders: Section
16 of the SecuritiesExchange Act, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 133-34 (1939).
1962]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
wrongdoing and the remedy is not dependent upon any relationship between
the parties to the purchase and sale. Moreover, the right of action is placed in
the corporation whose securities were subject to the dealing, 2 and recovery
goes neither to the shareholder nor to any past security holder but to the
corporation. 63 On the other hand, payments under section 16(b) are not like
ordinary "penalties" paid under regulatory or criminal statutes. Purchases and
sales by a director or officer within a six month period are not declared wrong-
ful in themselves.64 In fact, the statute applies regardless of whether wrong was
done. It merely takes the profit out of certain proscribed transactions-with-
out adding any amount as a penalty-by requiring the profit to be paid to
the corporation. Arguably the paying over of a profit, though under compul-
sion of law, by one who has done no wrong is more remedial than punitive.
What this discussion of section 16(b) makes clear, however, is that posing the
question of disallowance in terms of whether a statute is penal 05 or remedial
serves only to obfuscate the basic issue as to whether the responsible authority
-in this case Congress or the S.E.C.-intended an additional monetary sanc-
tion imposed for violation of a statute, and whether the practical needs of
enforcement would best be served by adding to the sanctions of the act.00
These problems have all stemmed from the fact that the primary statutes do
not reveal the manner in which the sanctions imposed under them should be
affected by the operation of the income tax laws: this is a question which can-
not be answered because the legislature that passed the statute and the en-
forcement authority that imposed the sanction have not considered the issue,
or, at least, have not reflected their consideration in materials available to the
IRS or the taxpayer. This lack of legislative and administrative concern, at
both the federal and state levels, is surprising in view of the widespread aware-
ness of the pervasive effect of the federal income tax on every branch of the
law.67 Surprising or not, the solution to the problem lies at the level of the
policymakers who formulate standards of conduct and the modes of assuring
compliance with these standards. The tax treatment of fines and penalties
62. Id. at 149.
63. Ibid.
64. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Proposals for Ancuding
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, H.R. Doc., 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 38 (1941).
65. "[T]he words 'penal' and 'penalty' have many different shades of meaning, and are
in fact the most elastic terms known to law." Ward v. Rice, 29 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E.D. Pa.
1939).
66. The Tax Court first held such payment nondeductible, on the ground that allowance
would frustrate the policy of § 16(b). Robert Lehman, 25 T.C. 629 (1955) ; William F.
Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951). The majority of the Tax Court has now decided that such
payments are deductible business expenses, at least where there is an "innocent" trans-
gression of the statute. Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956). The IRS has subsequently
adopted the view that a deduction for payments pursuant to § 16(b) will not be denied on the
ground that it frustrates sharply defined public policy. Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 Cum. BULL.
46, revoking I.T. 4069, 1952 Cum. BuLL. 28.
67. Cf. BrrrmR, FtzmLAL IxcomE EsTATE AND Girt TAXATxON 3 (1958).
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should not be left to the IRS precisely because in the final analysis it is not
essentially a matter of taxation at all.
Many of the manifold problems encountered in the disallowance of fines and
penalties could be obviated if the state legislature or Congress, when they
establish the monetary exactions for violations of any primary statute, would
include on the face of the act the desired tax treatment of penalties exacted
for noncompliance. Or, where an all-or-nothing approach seems too rigid, the
legislature could delegate to the agency responsible for enforcing the statute,
or the courts, the authority to decide whether the sanctions imposed should be
deductible, either by rule or on a case by case basis.0 Such a delegation would
allow the agency responsible for the public policy expressed in the statute to
appraise the offender's conduct in respect to a particular violation, instead of
leaving the issue to be litigated years later in a tax forum. Furthermore, the
question of whether the tax laws should increase or decrease a sanction im-
posed under other statutes would not arise: whether the expenditure is allowed
or disallowed, the penalty would be imposed by virtue of the statute which
has been violated by the taxpayer. The IRS and the taxpayer would not have
to decide whether a statute is punitive or remedial; the question would be
decided by the authorities who are responsible for the statute and therefore
most familiar with the policies expressed therein. And although this solution
allows other federal and state authorities to decide an issue arising under the
federal income tax laws, the only justification for the present treatment of fines
and penalties is to avoid "frustrating" the supposed policy of the primary
statutes; it therefore does not seem unreasonable for the IRS to abide by the
articulated policy of the responsible authorities, especially since these authori-
ties can, in fact, determine the tax treatment of these expenditures today
simply by manipulating labels-those of "penalty," on the one hand, and "com-
pensation" or "tax" on the other.
Illegal Expenditures
Illegal expenditures are payments made voluntarily by businessmen which
are themselves in violation of a regulatory or penal statute or connected with
an activity which violates such statutes.0 9 The public policy purported to be
frustrated by the allowance of their deduction is expressed in a statute
specifically prohibiting the expenditure, such as a price control law,70 or in a
statute prohibiting the specific activity in which they are incurred in the course
of an otherwise legal business, such as an anti-bribery or prohibition statute.7 '
68. For an example of such delegation in respect to one federal regulatory statute, see
note 46 supra.
69. See generally 4 M=RENs, LAw op FaanL% Ixcom!E TAXATioN §§ 25.131-.132
(1960).
70. E.g., Weather-Seal Mlfg. Co., 16 T.C. 1312 (1951), aff'd pcr curiaili, 199 F.2d 376
(6th Cir. 1952) ; Henry Watterson Hotel Co., 15 T.C. 902, aff'd, 194 F.2d 539 (6th Cir.
1952) ; Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 288 (Ct. Cl. 1957). Cf. Boyle, Flagg & Seaman
Inc., 25 T.C.43 (1955).
71. E.g., United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958) ; RE.L.. Finley, 27
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The various notions underlying the public policy doctrine as developed in the
area of penalties are carried over to disallow illegal expenditures without any
consideration of the differences, both in rationale and consequences, between
disallowance of sanctions imposed for a violation of a primary statute and the
disallowance of expenditures involved in unlawful activities. The differences,
however, are considerable. Although non-deductibility results in an additional
sanction in both cases, allowance or disallowance of illegal expenditures does
not necessarily operate to increase or decrease the sanctions of the primary
statute, as in the field of fines and penalties. 72 Consequently, unlike the area
of fines and penalties, a neutral attitude by the income tax law is here possible.la
Unlike the area of fines and penalties, furthermore, the scope of the public
policy doctrine as applied to illegal expenditures seems limitless. There is
nothing in its formulation or rationale to prevent disallowance of all expendi-
tures incurred in any activity which violates a given statute, whether the ex-
penditures constitute the act of violation or not.74 Thus, for example, con-
ceivably all of the production costs of a company violating the antitrust laws
could be disallowed on the theory that the manufacturing of goods to be sold
according to the terms of an illegal price fixing agreement contravenes the
policy of the Sherman Act. Similarly, Tank Truck's outlays for gas and oil
attributable to the unlawful overweight trips in Pennsylvania could be dis-
allowed under the rubric of the public policy doctrine. Theoretically, there-
fore, literally billions of regulated transactions could be policed through the
imposition of sanctions under the income tax laws. But practical considera-
tions concerning the efficient administration of the tax laws and the difficulties
involved in actively enforcing many other laws necessarily inhibit such a broad
use of the public policy doctrine.
Moreover, when a fine or penalty is disallowed, a violation has already
been ascertained by the responsible authorities. But where allegedly illegal
expenditures are in issue, often there has been no previous adjudication of
guilt, and, as a result, this question, which may pose considerable difficulties,
T.C. 413 (1956); Charles A. Clark, 19 T.C. 48 (1952); Rev. Rul. 55-307, 1955-1 Cum.
Buu.. 22. Cf. Excelsior Baking Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 423 (D. Minn. 1949).
72. See text at notes 35-36 supra.
73. This is not to say that disallowance or allowance will not discourage or encourage a
proscribed activity, but that treating illegal expenditures as business expenses will in no
way affect the sanctional provisions of the primary statutes and the enforcement policy of
the responsible agencies.
74. Cf. United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958). The district court
allowed a deduction for the taxpayer's purchases of alcoholic beverages in Oklahoma be-
cause Oklahoma statutes, although prohibiting the sale or transport of liquor within the
state, did not proscribe the purchase of such beverages. The Tenth Circuit, stating that
probably no case will arise where deduction is claimed for an expenditure which is itself
unlawful, reversed on the ground that there was no reason to distinguish between an ex-
penditure which is itself unlawful and one incurred for an unlawful purpose. For other
problems raised by the Tenth Circuit's disposition of this case, see text at notes 78-81 inlra.
See also Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955) ; James Ross, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1956);
text at notes 134-35 infra.
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must initially be decided by the tax authorities.75 And the difficulties are com-
pounded where, as is often the case, the economic controls transgressed by
businessmen are broadly worded and vaguely defined declarations of policy
entrusted to administrative agencies to develop standards by rule-making and
case by case adjudication. 76 Furthermore, if willfulness is an element of the
offense, the difficulty, discussed in connection with penalties, of appraising
conduct years after the violation has occurred is presenL
77
Although the public policy doctrine in respect to illegal expenditures has
not been administered on a broad scale, the problems envisaged above have
nevertheless been encountered. For instance, the expense of wining customers
in Oklahoma, when still a dry state, has frequently been disallowed on the
ground that the use of liquor for commercial purposes would contravene the
policy of the state.78 The Oklahoma courts, however, have held that the pur-
chase and possession of liquor for personal use or social purposes does not
violate any statute, and in 53 years of prohibition, one has yet to be prosecuted
or convicted of distributing liquor for business purposes."0 In Unlited Slatcs
v. Winters, the Tax Court noted that the statute had never been construed to
include the situation before it, but held that this was not determinative of the
question of deductibility." Other forums, recognizing these difficulties, have
allowed the taxpayer a deduction where, because of the complexity of the pri-
mary statute, its policy could not be ascertained."'
In Tank Truck, a case concerning penalties, the Supreme Court stated that
the public policy rule is not to be applied in any absolute sense, since an ac-
commodation is to be made between the congressional intent to tax net income
and the presumption against congressional intent to encourage violations.
Given the differences between penalties and illegal expenditures, this language
--when considered with the holding that where the expenditure is a penalty
or fine imposed because of an illegal act, the expenditure is clearly within the
line of disallowance-may reflect an awareness of the special problems involved
in utilizing the tax laws to provide an additional sanction in the area of illegal
75. See RCA Communications, Inc. v. United States, 277 F.2d 164 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
For an elaboration of the differences between similarly worded lottery statutes, and
the problems of construction involved, see generally Note, 33 U. DEr. L.J. 71 (1955).
i76. HUGHES, THE SUrn.Eit CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES 231 (1928) ; LArm, THE
REGULATIONS OF BUSINE-SS m 96 (1954) ; REPORT OF THE ATORNz Gz. 's NATio:iAL
CO=.irrrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAvs (1955).
77. See text at notes 45-46 supra.
78. R.g., United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958); R.E.L. Finley, 27
T.C. 413 (1956) ; Rev. Rul. 55-307, 1955-1 Ctu. BULL. 22. Cf. G. E. Fuller, 20 T.C. 303
(1958).
79. United States v. Winters, supra note 78.
80. Winters v. United States, 58-1 USTC ff 9205 (1958).
81. See RCA Communications, Inc. v. United States, 277 F.2d 164 (Ct. CL 1960);
Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956). Cf. Polley v. Westover, 77 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Cal.
1948). Some courts, however, instead of attempting to resolve the compledties of state
law, decide the issue of deductibility according to their own dictates of public policy. See
Kelly Dempsey & Co., 31 B.T.A. 351 (1934).
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expenditures.82 For the kind of statutes enforced, the proportion of violators
sanctioned, and the size of the sanction imposed, are primarily determined by
the mechanics of the income tax laws, and thus have no relation to the of-
fensiveness of the taxpayer's conduct, the enforcement policy of the responsible
officials, and the penalties of the primary statute.
The amount of the sanction imposed by the IRS, of course, will be equal to
the increase in tax liability because of disallowance. And this figure will in
turn depend on the amounts expended in the prohibited activity and on the
taxpayer's profits for the particular year in which the deduction is claimed.
That the result of disallowance is often an arbitrary and harsh sanction as com-
pared with those of the primary statute may be illustrated by the following
case :83 Taxpayer was an insurance agent in Illinois, which prohibits payments
for soliciting insurance to anyone except licensed insurance brokers. For viola-
tion of this statute, the state insurance commission could fine a violator $50-
$1,000 for each offense, revoke the seller's license, impose imprisonment, or
merely reprimand the seller.8 4 As part of a statewide practice of paying com-
missions to automobile dealers for referring buyers to insurance agents, taxpayer
paid $25,000 in one year and $50,000 in another to such dealers for soliciting cus-
tomers for him. The state insurance commission, upon learning of these ex-
penditures, reprimanded the taxpayer and conditioned his license on no further
violations. These rather mild measures were imposed because of the lack of
adequate enforcement during the years in question and the competitive condi-
tions in the insurance business as a result of the widespread practice of paying
commissions to automobile dealers. Subsequent to the state investigation, the
treasury denied the taxpayer a deduction for the $75,000 paid as commissions
on the ground that it would frustrate the policy of the statute prohibiting the
payments. Assuming the taxpayer was in the fifty per cent income tax bracket,
he paid approximately $35,000 more taxes for engaging in these proscribed
activities. The tax penalty paid by other taxpayers for engaging in the same
activities would depend on their income and losses during the years in ques-
tion; if, for various reasons, an insurance broker had no taxable income dur-
ing the year for which the deduction is sought, his penalty for the same
offense would be $35,000 less than the insurance broker's described above.
82. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958). This interpreta-
tion is supported by another decision rendered by the Court on the same day, Commissioner
v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), in which the expenses of a gambling business proscribed by
state law were found to be deductible. See text at notes 135-43 infra. It is contradicted, how-
ever, by other language of the Court in Tank Truck:
Certainly the frustration of state policy is most complete and direct when the
expenditure for which deduction is sought is itself prohibited by statute.. .. If the
expenditure is not itself an illegal act, but rather the payment of a penalty imposed
by the State because of such an act, as in the present case, the frustration attendant
upon deduction would be only slightly less remote, and would clearly fall within the
line of disallowance (sic].
356 U.S. at 35.
83. Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955).
84. Id. at 46.
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But the issue raised by disallowance of these expenditures goes beyond the
apparent inequity between offender-taxpayers because of the mechanics of the
Internal Revenue Code. The problem lies in the Treasury's view that a
proscription articulating a norm of conduct, apart from any relevant context,
constitutes the total expression of public policy on the matter.8 In fact, how-
ever, the sanctional provisions of statutes, specifying the actions to be taken
when breaches occur, together with the enforcement decisions of the responsible
authorities, are as integral a part of the federal or state policy toward these
activities as the proscription itself.80 Furthermore, the mere existence of severe
deprivational sanctions in economic regulations does not indicate their actual
85. See Frederick C. Moser, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 116, 120-21 (1959) ; Israel Silber-
man, 44 B.T.A. 600, 603 (1941) :
Petitioner's argument in essence is that his gambling operations were only "a
little bit" illegal because the penalty of forfeiture of a bet received if a civil action
is brought to recover the bet is only a light penalty. The only merit of the argument
is its humor. We must proceed here with recognition that without any doubt betting,
receiving, and recording bets, letting a booth be used for the same, and assisting any
one in doing the same, all were illegal under New York statutes.
Cf. Nicholas Wusich, 35 T.C. 279 (1960). That the policy of disallowance may be in-
consistent with the goals of the criminal law is well exemplified by the court's disallowance
in this case of payments made in restitution to a bonding company by a taxpayer who had
misappropriated bank funds and received a suspended sentence. It was believed that de-
duction of such restitutionary payments would remove some of the "sting" from the con-
sequences of the taxpayer's wrongdoing. Accord, Casey O'Brien, 36 T.C. 957 (1961).
86. ARENs & LASSWELL, Ix DEFENSE oF PuBLc ORsm 9-23 (1961); Schwenk, The
Administrative Critne, Its Creation and Punishment by Administrative Agencies, 42 Micar.
L. REv. 51, 85 (1943) ; Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. Ray. 1057, 1075-77
(1955). For an example of prosecutorial discretion not to invoke the criminal law, see
Statement of [then] Attorney General Jackson, Hearings on the Nomination of Robert
H..Jackson to be an Associate Justice of the Suprente Court, Before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-69 (1941).
And see the dissent in United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (1958):
From these decisions, it does indeed seem logical to conclude that the Oklahoma
courts would sustain a criminal charge for serving intoxicating liquor to business
guests in one's ownhome. It is significant for our purposes, however, that as far as we
know, no such charge has ever been reported in more than fifty years of prohibition in
Oklahoma. It seems only fair to assume, therefore, that at the enforcement level,
at least, the prohibitioi laws have not been construed so severely.
'When the Oklahoma law is thus construed in tie context of human conduct, it is
extremely doubtful that the taxpayer has severely and immediately frustrated any
very well defined public policy of Oklahoma with respect to the prohibition aws. As
one living in the state since the very inception of the law, and as one claiming some
- -.accquaintance with the mores of the communityI certainly cannot say so.
This is not to say the letter of the law is subordinate to its'observance so that a
law honored in its breach does not reflect public policy. It is to say that the law is
interpreted not only by the courts, but also by the mores of the community wherein
it is effective. Indeed, the people make the law, and by their conduct construe it to
reflect the public policy of the state.
Id. at 681. But see Note, Of Lawyers and Laymen: A Study of Federalisn, the Judicial
Process, and Erie, 71 YAE L.J. 344 (1961).
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use. For instance, the nominal authority of the FCC to terminate a license
rather than to renew it has rarely, if ever, been used. Similarly, severe sanc-
tions for unpopular or unenforced legislation, such as many milk price control
statutes, although available, are seldom employed.8 7 Where severe deprivation-
al sanctions are.provided in the primary statute, the decision to invoke them
in any case will depend on many factors, most of which would seem to be
beyond the institutional capacity of the numerous authorities resolving tax
controversies.
The responsible authority may also, utilize a variety of sanctions or sane-
tional equivalents to secure compliance, such as cease and desist orders, in-
spection, licensing, revocation, warnings, informal conferences, and publicity. 88
Indeed, the very choice of given sanctions reflects a community value judg-
ment as to the kind of deprivations that are deemed appropriate for specified
conduct in a particular factual setting.8 9 When the Treasury disallows de-
ductions of expenditures incurred in a proscribed activity, it thereby alters the
response or set of responses deliberately chosen by the responsible agency
which presumably will most justly and efficiently maximize formalized com-
munity values. Thus, with regard to the insurance commissions, the responsible
agency looked beyond the words of a given body of authoritative language in
order to discover a realistic factual basis and imposed the sanctions appropriate
for this context. Apparently, the state commission determined that invocation
of the other available sanctions under the statute would result in a greater
value deprivation than the taxpayer's conduct warranted. In contrast, the
Treasury regarded itself as the blind instrument of something vaguely called
public policy or "the laws" in the dubious sense of the formal proscription 00-
a position which can be justified only by arguments necessarily involving the
approval of the maximum punishment possible within the formal requirements
of any law for any act which is prohibited by any authority within the society.
Such a premise contravenes the basic precepts of democratic society at mid-
century.
Because of the uncertainty of the scope and applicability of the public policy
doctrine in the area of illegal expenditures and of the substantial cost of disal-
lowance, the taxpayer is sorely tempted to disguise his illegal expenditures as
87. Note, Government Regulation of Prices: A Study of Milk Control in Pcmsylvalia,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 600 (1961). See generally, Mangum, Milk Control Laws in the
United States, 38 N.C. L. REV. 419 (1960). Cf. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke
the Crimtinal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YAMX
L.J. 543 (1960). CLxNARD, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 249 (1957).
88. See Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by Adminis-
trative Agencies, 42 MIcH. L. REV. 51, 85 (1943) ; Dession, Book Review, 58 HARry. L, REv.
621 (1945). See generally Dession, Sanctions, Law and Public Order, 1 VANSI. L. REv. 8
(1947).
89. Dession, Final Draft of the Code of Correction for Puerto Rico §§ 3-5 and notes
reprinted in 71 YAIa L.J. 1051, 1065-73 (1962); ARENS & LAsswEU., IN DErssE oF
PuBLC ORBER 220-26 (1961).
90. See dissent in United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675, 680 (1958), supra note 86.
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ordinary business expenses under such innocuous expense headings as ad-
vertising, entertainment, public relations, and commissions.,, Since the number
of returns selected for investigation is relatively small compared with the num-
ber of returns filed,92 the effectiveness of disallowance as an enforcement mea-
sure thus depends on the criteria employed in determining the returns selected
for audit.93 But the purposes of audit may not coincide with the objectives of.
the primary statutes. Thus, to the extent the auditing program is directed at
the production of additional revenue, deductions of taxpayers in the upper
income brackets may well be subject to far more scrutiny than those of tax-
payers with smaller taxable incomes. 94 An enforcement policy, however, de-
signed to ferret out violators with substantial income may frequently not accord
with the objects of the primary statute.
The difficulty of formulating criteria which would be effective in distinguish-
ing bonajfide discounts, commissions, and entertainment and advertising ex-
penses from illegal expenditures and in detecting the occurance of innumerable
types of statutory transgressions perhaps accounts for the limited selection of
primary statutes which receive supplemental enforcement through the tax
laws. Thus, apparently because of a higher visibility of possible offenses, the
statutes presently selected for supplemental enforcement are characterized by
a close connection between the expenditures and the illegal activity, such as
price control laws and others prohibiting rebates, commissions, and allowances.
Aside from administrative feasibility, however, there is no reason why the
statutes selected are in greater need of supplemental enforcement by the IRS
than many other statutes. The mere presence of a close relationship between
the expenditure and the illegal act is hardly a rational criterion for deciding
which of many statutes regulating trade practices should be actively enforced.05
The result of the criteria used by the IRS has been the enforcement of
proscriptions which are often unenforced in the jurisdiction of their enactment.
For instance, the IRS has frequently challenged rebates paid in violation of the
Pennsylvania and other state milk control laws. 0 Because of public indiffer-
ence or dislike for the objects of the regulatory scheme in Pennsylvania-
which is primarily to aid dairy farmers in the state-the administrator of the
statute, the Milk Control Board, rarely prosecutes for violations of the act,
91. See Lorraine Corp., 33 B.T.A. 1158, 1161 (1936).
92. Spencer, Income Tax Controversies With The Internal Revenue Agent it Charge,
64 HAuv. L. REv. 547,551 (1951).
93. For obvious reasons the criteria actually employed by the IRS are not publicly
known. BrrTx, op. cit. supra note 67, at 734.
94. Id. at 734-37.
95. The selection of statutes for active enforcement passive enforcement, and non-
enforcement is generally based upon many variables, the most important of which is com-
munity sentiment toward the proscribed activities at any given time or place. See Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 YMA.E L.J. 543 (1960).
96. Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26 T.C. 707 (1956) ; Rosedale Dairy Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 951 (1957); Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961); Bloomingdale
Dairy Co., 30 P-H Tax Ct. M1ew. 633 (1961).
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although such -violations are rampant.9 7 Moreover, even when prosecutions do
occur, the state courts often do not allow the Board to utilize any of the
deprivational sanctions available under the act. 5 But the enforcement policy
of the IRS finds these factors irrelevant, and substantial amounts of rebates
have been challenged because of the assumed public policy of this statute. 0 Ex-
cept where inimical to the interests of some larger group, however, the desire of a
community to enforce the laws according to its needs and tolerances should
be respected. When the responsible officials become aware of apparent offenses
and tolerate them by refusing to invoke sanctions, the proscription in question
is nominal, not effective law; and enforcement by the IRS in such circum-
stances amounts to an arbitary defeat of reasonable expectations.100
In many cases, moreover, the use of the tax laws to enforce regulatory
statutes has been largely impaired by the apparent distinction between cost of
goods sold and business expenses; this is a distinction which is without signi-
ficance or relevance to the enforcement objectives of the federal or state regula-
tory legislation, but which supposedly contains constitutional overtones as to
the federal income tax laws.10' Thus, for example, in order to check inflation,
both the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the Defense Production
Act of 1950 provide that if price ceilings are imposed, regulations stabilizing
wages must be issued "at the same time"; the acts, in other words, presuppose
simultaneous general control of prices and wages.10 2 But the courts, while ap-
proving the disallowance of wage payments on the ground that such expendi-
tures do not constitute a part of cost of goods sold or a return of capital, 0 3 have
consistently allowed deductions sought for materials purchased in violation of the
maximum price regulations, often on the tenuous .ground that there is no
specific statutory provision authorizing disallowance, 0 4 but primarily on the
ground that disallowance of expenditures which represent cost of goods sold
will result in an unconstitutional tax on gross receipts.'0 5 Similarly, in cases
97. Note, Government Regulation of Prices: A Study of Milk Control in Pennsylvania,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 604 (1961).
98. See id. at 600-02.
99. See Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 288, 292 (Ct. CI. 1957) (dissent), eerl.
denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957) ; Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948). Cf. Southern Pac. Co.
v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918) ; I.T. 4102, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 173, modifying I.T. 3724, 1945
Cuar. BULL. 57.
100. For an excellent discussion of retroactivity and the law, see Comment, Prospective
Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
101. E.g., Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26 T.C. 707 (1956).
102. Defense Production Act of 1950, §§ 402(b) (2) (3), 64 Stat. 803; Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23; Stabilization Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 765. See Field, Economic
Stabilization Under the Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 HARv. L. Rv., 1, 2-8 (1950).
103. Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 288 (Ct. CI. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
829 (1957); Weather-Seal Mfg. Co., 16 T.C. 1312 (1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 376 (6th Cir.
1952) ; Gilmore v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal, 1955) ; Sidney Zelhnan, 27
T.C. 876 (1957).
104. Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952).
105. See Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile, Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Com-
missioner v. Guminski, 198 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Clark v. United States, 107 F. Supp.
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involving state minimum price control statutes, sellers who reduce the purchase
price by making yearly gifts to purchasers or by rendering free advertising
services to them will probably have these amounts disallowed;100 other sellers
who reduce the purchase price by giving cash rebates or discounts at the
moment of sale, although equally violative of the price control statute, may re-
duce their tax liability by these amounts because they are deductible from gross
receipts.' 07 Therefore, sanctions imposed under the tax laws can be avoided by
simply changing the method of violating the primary statute.
As the maintenance of ethical standards may be "frustrated" by granting tax
deductions for expenses incurred in violating these standards, the courts have
extended the public policy doctrine to disallow morally offensive ex\penditures,
even where no statute specifically declares them unlawful. 08 Conveniently called
"immoral expenditures," this category includes various kinds of influence pay-
ments, such as bribes and protection payments, and the fee splitting practices of
professional groups. In Lilly v. Commissioner,109 however, the Court sharply
restricted the disallowance of immoral expenditures. The taxpayer in Lilly had
operated an optical business in North Carolina for many years. In computing
the net income of his company, the taxpayer deducted payments made to
physicians under an agreement by which each physician, after prescribing lenses,
would attempt to guide his patient to the optical company for the work of grind-
ing the lenses and furnishing the frames. Although this practice of accepting
"kickbacks" from optical companies was not forbidden by any statutory pro-
vision, state or federal, and reflected an established and widespread practice, it
was frowned upon and considered unethical by the state and national medical
associations. The reaction of the Tax Court was characteristic of the traditional
attitude of the IRS and the courts. Since the payments sought to be deducted
were directly connected with the contracts between the physicians and the optical
company, a determination that the contracts contravened public policy would
as a matter of law render the payments nondeductible. The absence of statutory
law condemning the practice was not in itself, the court believed, sufficient
evidence of the absence of such a public policy. And holding that the judicial
decisions can also evidence public policy, the court found that innumerable
554 (N.D. Tex. 1951) ; Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076, 1077 (1948). The theory seems to be
that the sixteenth amendment is the source of congressional power to tax income, and "in-
come" as used in the amendment means gross rather than net income; accordingly, deduc-
tions from gross income in the computation of taxable income may be disallowed as they are
a matter of congressional grace. Since the cost of goods is deducted not from gross income
but from gross receipts in the computation of gross income, the failure to allow a deduction
would result in the tax falling not on gross income, which is permissible, but on gross re-
ceipts or return of capital, which is not permitted by the sixteenth amendment.
106. Cf. Frederick C. Moser, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 116 (1959).
107. Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. No. 17 (1961); Tri-State Beverage
Distribs., Inc., 27 T.C. 1026 (1957) ; Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26 T.C. 707 (1956).
108. See Excelsior Baking Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 423 (D. Minn. 1949);
Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. 17 T.C. 566 (1951); Kelley-Dempsey & Co., 31 B.T.A. 351
(1934).
109. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
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court decisions have declared contracts such as these to be unenforceable as
contrary to public policy.110
The Supreme Court, however, rejected these views, reasoning that the
"policies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced by some
governmental declaration of them."1 The Court added that the unenforce-
ability of the contracts between the taxpayer and physicians because of some
vague notions of public policy is immaterial to the question of disallowance
under the tax laws and thereby implied that a mere judicial declaration of
public policy alone may not be sufficient. Subsequent cases reveal, however,
that the requirement of sharply defined governmental declarations interposed
by Lilly has not clarified the application of the public policy doctrine to im-
moral expenditures. Thus, the more offensive forms of commercial bribery are
still disallowed although the legality of these expenditures under state law
is not put in issue. Rather, the question of whether bribes and other influence
payments are deductible seems to turn on the offensiveness of these payments
to the tax authorities, regardless of local law." 2
Litigation Expenses
Although the Lilly case seems to require a definite governmental declara-
tion of policy before disallowance, deductibility of legal expenses has been un-
affected by this requirement. Presumably, there are no statutes which declare
the securing of counsel and the payment of litigation expenses illegal. Never-
theless, although legal expenses incurred in litigation arising from a tax-
payer's profit seeking activities are deductible business expenses,118 it is a well
established principle in tax law that public policy generally requires the
disallowance of these expenses whenever the prosecution is a penal or criminal
one and the outcome is in any way adverse to the defendant-taxpayer. 114 The
apparent inconsistency between the requirement of Lilly and the treatment of
legal expenses is in part a result of the Court's ambiguous reasoning in Comn.
missioner v. Heininger,"r decided shortly before Lilly. Heininger, a dentist,
operated a mail order business in false teeth. The Postmaster General found
110. Lilly v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1066, 1078-80, 188 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1951).
111. 343U.S.at97.
112. Compare Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 17 T.C. 566 (1951), and Excelsior Baking
Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 423 (D. Minn. 1949), with Fiambolis v. United States,
152 F. Supp. 10 (E.D.S.C. 1957), and Frank J. Valetti, 28 T.C. 692 (1957). See also Rev.
Rul. 58-479, 1958-2 Cum. BULL 60.
113. E.g., Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928) ; Hopkins v. Commissioner,
271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Guttmann v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Pa.
1960).
114. Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931);
Richard F. Smith, 31 T.C. 1 (1958). But see John W. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
See G.C.M. 19976, 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 120. See generally McDonald, Deduction of At-
torneys' Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. Iav. 168 (1954) ; Brookes,
Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAx L. REV. 241 (1957).
115. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
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that statements made in his advertisements were misleading as well as overly
optimistic and issued a fraud order, depriving the taxpayer of the use of the
mails. Because a denial of access to the mails meant destruction of his business,
the taxpayer engaged counsel and sought to enjoin the enforcement of the fraud
order. He was ultimately unsuccessful, and thereafter deducted from his gross
income the lawyer's fees and the other expenses incurred in the extensive litiga-
tion. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on two grounds: It is not
necessary to conduct a lawful business in an illegal manner, and therefore it
is neither "ordinary" nor "necessary" to defend an unnecessary activity; and
even if the legal fees were "ordinary and necessary," allowance of the fees
would be against public policy, for they were incurred in an unsuccessful effort
to frustrate the prohibitions of activities Congress had condemned.""
In reversing, the Supreme Court pointed out that the taxpayer's legal ex-
penses were both "ordinary and necessary" in the commonly accepted meaning
of the words. For the taxpayer to employ counsel in good faith to defend his
business against the threatened destruction was a normal and appropriate re-
sponse on his part. A finding, therefore, "that this course of conduct and the
expenses which it involved were extraordinary or unnecessary would be to
ignore the ways of conduct and the forms of speech prevailing in the business
world.""17 But the ambiguity arises from the manner in which the Court re-
jected the Government's public policy argument. If the taxpayer's expenses
were to be disallowed, said the Court, it must be because allowing the deduc-
tion would frustrate the policy of the statute under which the Government's
claim of fraud was sustained. The Court added that the policy of the statute in
question was not to impose personal punishment on violators but to protect
the public from fraudulent practices, thereby implying that the deduction of
the expenses incurred in litigation is somehow related to the punitive policy
of the statute against which the taxpayer defends. But the Court also stated, in
referring both to the civil statute under which the taxpayer was prosecuted and
its criminal counterpart, that it is not the policy of either to "deter persons
accused of violating their terms from employing counsel to assist in presenting
a bona fide defense to a proposed fraud order.""18 Whatever was actually in-
tended, the Heininger case has generally been interpreted to mean that legal
fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense are allowable only where the action
is a civil one."19 Thus, the expenses of defending against civil actions brought
116. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8 -13, Heininger v. United States, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
117. 320 U.S. at 472.
118. Id. at 474.
119. See, e.g., Longhorn Portland Cement, 3 T.C. 310, rev'd on other grounds, 148 F.2d
376 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); Commissioner v. Schwart, 232 F.2d
94 (5th Cir. 1956). Cf. James E. Caldwell & Co., 234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956). But cf.
Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956).
Before Heininger, legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a state or
federal antitrust suit; whether civil or criminal, were not deductible. See Commissioner v.
Continental Screen Co., 58 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Burroughs Bld'g Material Co. v. Com-
missioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931). See generally Smith, Deduction by Corporations of
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under state anti-trust laws and revenue provisions are deductible, whereas
those incurred in unsuccessfully defending against actions brought under the
criminal counterparts of these statutes, based on the same unlawful conduct,
are not.1 2 0 A problematical situation arises where the taxpayer expends sub-
stantial amounts before an indictment is returned in attempting to forestall
criminal prosecution, or where the taxpayer compromises the criminal charge
without admitting guilt. Where the taxpayer's efforts are unsuccessful either in
avoiding prosecution or in securing an acquittal, most courts have held all of
the amounts so expended non-deductible ;121 a few courts, seeing the difficulties
posed by these distinctions, have allowed deduction of legal expenses where
the civil or criminal charges are compromised.1
22
None of the courts, however, has reconciled the Lilly requirement of a
governmental declaration of policy and the disallowance of legal fees. Since
it is doubtful that the sharply defined policy of any statute would be frustrated
by a rule allowing a deduction for expenditures incurred in defenses against
claims by the government, all attorney fees incurred in opposing governmental
claims would seem to be deductible under the Lilly rule. This result seems rea-
sonable, since to deny deduction of such expenses is to treat them in the same
manner as statutory penalties are presently treated and, in effect, to add to
the sanctions provided by the primary statute.
However, it has been asserted that, if all attorney fees were deductible,
a purported violator in the high income brackets might indiscriminately spend
large sums in opposition to every government action,128 since the actual cost
to the taxpayer would be a small percentage of the amount expended. In-
dividuals and corporations subject to the higher tax rates would thus be
given an incentive to resist such claims, regardless of whether they had a good
faith defense or not; and this, in turn, would not only hinder the government
in securing convictions, but also would lead to increased expenses of investiga-
tions and extended trials. But such an assertion fails to explain why disallow-
ance is limited to criminal prosecutions and, in addition, to those criminal prose-
cutions in which the taxpayer is convicted. If allowance encourages litigation,
it does so for civil as well as criminal actions. And allowing a tax deduction
for successful defenses would seem to place a premium on successfully re-
sisting the government's action, thus protracting litigation by inhibiting con-
Expenses of Litigation in Their Defense of Alleged Anti-Trust Violations, N.Y.U. 8Tu
INST. oN FED. TAx 646 (1950).
120. E.g., Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other grounds,
361 U.S. 87 (1959) ; Port v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 645 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
121. See, e.g., Tracy v. United States, 284 F.2d 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960). Cf. Universal Atlas
Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 971, 976 (1947), aff'd 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962 (1949) ; Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F.2d
373 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Davenshire, Inc., 12 T.C. 958 (1949).
122. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shapiro, 278 F2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Commissioner v.
Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C. 314 (1945).
123. Concerning resistance to prosecution, see Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissloner,
175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949), and excerpt quoted in note 17 supra.
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promises between the government and the taxpayer.'2 4 Moreover, if allowance
tends unduly to favor the high income taxpayer, disallowance necessarily pre-
judices the defendants with lower incomes.
One middle course that has been suggested is to allow deductions only for
defenses asserted in good faith.'2 5 But a test based on the bona fides of the
defense would seem to place an impossible burden on the courts, the IRS,
and the taxpayer. Besides the inconsistency of applying this test only to un-
successful defenses-since a favorable result is not necessarily an evidence of
honest and reasonable defense-it is difficult to see what standards are to be
used to ascertain whether a taxpayer's unsuccessful defense was in good faith.
Is a compromise between the government and the taxpayer evidence of good
faith? What of a conviction on only one of many counts brought against
the taxpayer, or of a consent decree, guilty plea, or plea of vollo contendere?
Should these be distinguished from the situation where the taxpayer vigorously
resists the government's charges, only to learn that the vague statute under
which he is prosecuted is construed against him or that his claim of unconstitu-
tionality is rejected?
Even aside from the problems of administration, the public policy grounds
for disallowance of legal expenses are questionable. True, the Treasury has
argued, sometimes successfully, that it is unnecessary to defend against any
actions by the government if one is guilty; any money expended in so doing is
wasted and therefore not necessary.'G Such an argument assumes not only
that thrift is or should be potent motive among those who violate the criminal
law but also that criminals-unlike judges-can accurately predict the out-
come of criminal cases before hearing the evidence. The Treasury's argument,
moreover, appears especially inappropriate when applied to vague statutes
regulating trade practices, in which neither the government nor the defendant
can, in any real sense, be said to know the requirements of the law before it
is declared by the courts.2 7
In any case, since the attorney services under discussion are performed be-
fore guilt has been established, the ultimate assumption of disallowance of
these expenses--that there is an unstated federal policy to deter persons ac-
cused of violating the law from employing counsel to assist in presenting de-
fenses to a criminal charge-is dubious. Authoritative declarations are to the
contrary. Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor any other statute or govern-
mental declaration repeals the constitutional presumption of innocence in
criminal cases. The sixth amendment provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions.., the accused shall have the assistance of
counsel for his defense ....
124. See Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 971, 976 (1947), off'd
per curiam, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962 (1949).
125. McDonald, stpra note 114, at 181-82.
126. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 6-21, Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
See National Outdoor Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937).
127. See text at note 76 supra.
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And the refusal of both state and federal courts to award counsel fees to the
successful litigant in the analogous field of civil litigation, in contrast to the
English system, is premised upon a public policy designed to encourage rather
than discourage litigation, 128 regardless of the bona fides of the action or de-
fense.
Illegal Business
The illegal business is distinguished from the situations described above in
that a state statute declares the entire business of a taxpayer unlawful instead
of prohibiting specified activities of an otherwise lawful business. The most com-
mon examples are gambling and bookmaking establishments. It has long been
held that the income from illegal businesses is subject to the income tax.120 If
there is any virtue in the public policy doctrine that disallows all deductions
which frustrate sharply defined governmental policies, then it would seem
axiomatic that all of the expenditures of a business whose very existence is
repugnant to state policy would be disallowed. And, except for gambling losses
which the Code explicitly permits up to the amount of gambling gains,18 0 some
courts have so held, on the theory that any disbursements in furtherance of the
unlawful enterprise contravenes the policy of the statutes prohibiting the en-
tire business.13 1
128. 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrCE 1 54.70[2] (2d ed. 1953):
The extent to which actual expenses are allowed as costs can have a significant effect
upon the encouragement or discouragement of litigation. Advocates of the English
practice claim that the allowance of the successful party's legal expenses would only
make him whole; that it will discourage the institution of unfounded litigation or the
maintenance by groundless defenses, except possibly by financially irresponsible
persons, and at the same time will encourage a meritorious suit or defense. The pro-
ponents of the American practice claim, however, that the English system deters the
bringing of just claims or the maintenance of a just defense as well as unjust ones,
because of the fear of being saddled with the opponent's legal expenses. They claim
that "every man has an inalienable right to go to law."
Id. at 1303-04. See also Note, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940).
129. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). The Court, pcr Mr. Justice
Holmes, could "see no reason ... why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt It
from paying the taxes that if lawful it would have to pay." Id. at 263. It was also stated,
however, in reply to the suggestion that a deduction should be allowed for bribery if claimed
by an illegal business, "it will be time enough to consider the question when a taxpayer has
the temerity to raise it." Id. at 264. See note 1 supra.
130. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (d).
Before this amendment in 1934, a loss deduction was allowed only if the state permitted or
condoned gambling. Francis M. Cronan, 33 B.T.A. 668 (1935); E.F. Simms, 28 B.T.A.
988 (1933) ; M. Rea Gano, 19 B.T.A. 518 (1930). The present section has been construed to
allow losses up to the amount of gain, regardless of the illegality of the enterprise. E.g.,
Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242 (Ct. Cl. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948 (1951)
Roy T. Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951). See also Winkler v. United States, 230 F.2d 766, 776
(1st Cir. 1956). But the purpose of this section, which was to linit loss deductions for
lawful gambling, did not compel this result. See H.R. Ra. No. 704, pt. 1, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1934), S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1934).
131. Albert D, MrGrath, 27 T.C. 117 (1956) ; Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955) (see note
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Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Sullivan,"' other
courts, taking a closer look at the various expenditures of gambling establish-
ments, distinguished between the "legitimate" expenses of an illegal business,
as, for instance, rent and salaries, and the "illegitimate" ones, such as protec-
tion payments, attorney fees in defense of the business, and bribes. The former
expenses have been allowed deduction, because they are the "integral" ex-
penses of the unlawful business as opposed to the "concomitant" ones 0-al-
though it is difficult to see how protection payments are any less customary,
widespread, or indeed indispensable for gambling enterprises than the pay-
ments for rent and wages--or simply because deduction of such expenses does
not frustrate sharply defined public policy,"" which is, of course, merely a
statement of the conclusion. Another ground for the allowance of the "legiti-
mate" expenses is that such expenses are not specifically prohibited by any
statute, since most statutes outlaw gambling enterprises in broad general terms.
The Treasury, justifiably puzzled by this distinction, argued that some state stat-
tutes not only declare the operation of a gambling establishment illegal, but also
specifically provide that employees and landlords who assist in the conduct of
such businesses are equally guilty of the commission of an illegal acLty In the
Sullivan case the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner in disallowing all the ex-
penses of a bookmaking business because of a more detailed state accessory stat-
ute. 36 The court stated that "it is inconceivable that [the taxpayer] should be
permitted a deduction for amounts spent to procure the commission of an act out-
lawed by a state statute .... ,,137
The Supreme Court decided the Sullivan case at the same time as Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, and, unanimously affirming the Seventh
Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court, allowed the deduction of the payments
for rent and salaries of a bookmaking business. 38 The reasons articulated for
deductiblity are not only irreconcilable with the rationale of Tank Truck but
136 infra) ; Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947) ; Andrew Klar, 10 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 972 (1941) ; Israel Silberman, 44 B.T.A. 600 (1941).
132. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
133. E.g., Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1956).
134. omeaux v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 201 (1948), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949). In referring to the difference be-
tween the legal and illegal expenditures of an unlawful business, the Tax Court in this
case stated: "The distinction may at first seem nebulous, but it is nonetheless real." 10
T.C. at 207.
Another ground for distinguishing between the deductible and nondeductible expenses of
an unlawful business was the "leprous character" of the unlawful business. This characteriza-
tion was used to justify disallowance of the medical expenses of an abortionist. Joseph
Karger, 13 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 661, 664 (1954).
135. See James Ross, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 23 (1956); Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513,
520-25 (1955) (see note 136 infra).
136. Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955), rez'd sub no . Mesi v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d
558 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'd stb nota. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) (con-
solidated appeal).
137. 25 T.C. at 523.
138. 356 U.S.27 (1958).
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also cast doubt upon the validity of any policy supporting disallowance of il-
legal expenditures. In referring to the payments for rent and wages, the Court
said they were clearly "'ordinary and necessary expenses' in the accepted
meaning of those words,"' 3 9 although Tank Truck held that a finding of
"necessity" cannot be made if allowance would frustrate sharply defined na-
tional or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct.140 Why, then,
was the deduction allowed in Sullivan not found to frustrate the policy of the
state statutes that were violated by the payments in question? Quoting from
Heininger, the Court explained that "the 'fact an expenditure bears a remote
relation to an illegal act' does not make it nondeductible."141 But no such
remote relationship existed in Sullivan; the expenditures were directly viola-
tive of state statutes.14 The only plausible distinction between Tank Truck
and Sullivan is found in the difference betveen the expenditures sought to be
deducted: in Sullivan, not penalties, but illegal expenditures were the dis-
bursements at issue. Some support for this distinction is found in the Court's
statement in Sullivan: "That [the amounts are ordinary and necessary ex-
penses in the accepted meaning of those words] is enough to permit the deduc-
tion, unless it is clear that the allowance is a device to avoid the consequence of
violations of a law .. . ,,143 As applied to the facts of Sullivan, it is clear that
the claimed deductions were not the consequence of a statutory violation as
were the penalties in Tank Truck.
But this rationale would mean that a deduction will be disallowed only where
it constitutes a means for avoiding or mitigating the penal consequences of a
statutory violation as opposed to the prior more general test of whether al-
lowance would frustrate the policy of the primary statute. This explanation of
the Sullivan case would thus limit the public policy doctrine to the disallowance
of fines and penalties, since only the deduction of these could properly be called
a device to avoid the consequences of a statutory violation. While one may
make a plausible and consistent argument for restricting disallowance to such
expenditures, since a "neutral" attitude toward them is not possible,144 there
is no indication in the Sullivan decision that the Court was sub silentlio over-
ruling a multitude of cases disallowing bribes, legal fees, expenditures in
violation of price control laws, and many other forms of illegal expenditures.
139. Id. at 29.
140. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30,33 (1958).
141. 356 U.S. at 29.
142. As the Tax Court stated in its opinion in Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955) (see note
136 mspra) :
Pursuant to these sections of the criminal code of the State of Illinois, the payment
of the wages in question in and of itself constituted an illegal act .... Certainly, it
would be a clear violation of public policy to permit the deduction of an expenditure,
the making of which constitutes an illegal act.
25 T.C. at 522.
The Seventh Circuit did not deny that these payments violated the criminal laws of
Illinois. Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1957).
143. 356 U.S. at 29. (Emphasis added.)
144, Sve generally text at notes 35-85 mipra.
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Moreover, the Court's statement in Tank Truck--"'the frustration of state policy
is most complete and direct when the expenditure for which deductions is
sought is itself prohibited by statute" 4 5 --directly contradicts this explanation
of the holding as well as the result in Sullivan. Nor have the lower courts fol-
lowed such a construction of Sullivan.'4" In fact, since the Sullivan case, in one
of the few criminal tax prosecutions in the evidently unsettled area of disal-
lowed deductions, a taxpayer has been convicted of willfully evading the income
tax by seeking to deduct expenditures characterized as bribes.14 7
The only other ground relied on by the Court seems unsound. Because
gambling enterprises are subject to a federal excise tax, the Court reasoned
that such enterprises are therefore recognized as a business for federal tax
purposes. Moreover, since the IRS allowed a business expense deduction for
amounts paid under the excise tax, there was a federal policy sufficiently
hospitable to gambling establishments to allow the deduction of their ordinary
and necessary expenses.' 48 Besides ignoring a rather direct e.xpression of state
policy for a dubious federal one, this rationale abrogates the public policy
doctrine altogether, since all businesses subject to the income tax are pre-
sumably recognized as a business for federal tax purposes. If the special
recognition is to be found, not in the income tax, but in the special excise on
gambling enterprises, then the difficulty arises that there is nothing in that act
or its legislative background to warrant favorable tax treatment for those
enterprises subject to the tax; indeed, Congress expressly disclaimed any
intent in enacting the wagering tax to confer legitimacy on gambling enter-
prises which are unlawful under state law 149
The Court also added the following in Sullivan: "If we enforce as federal
policy the rule espoused by the Commissioner in this case, we would come
close to making this type of business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts,
145. 356 U.S. at 35.
146. See, e.g., Tracy v. United States, 284 F2d 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960) ; Casy O'Brien, 36
T.C. No. 98 (1961).
147. See United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548, 552 (D. Mass. 1961), applica-
tion for prerogative writ denied sub norn. In re Callahan, 285 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1960). See
also Note, 71 YALE L.J. 551 (1962).
The latest foray of the IRS has been to rule that "payola" 'payments are non-deductible
if paid after 1959, when the FTC issued complaints against certain individuals for engaging
in such practices. Payments before this date are deductible unless they violate sharply de-
fined state statutes. This ruling ignores the fact that the mere issuance of complaints against
persons who received "payola" payments, prior to adjudication of guilt, does not itself con-
stitute an authoritative proscription of such activities. It would not appear that allegations
of the FTC are entitled to more respect as a declaration of public policy than the declarations
of a court, which, by itself, may not be a sufficient declaration of a "sharply defined" public
policy. Rev. Rul. 62-133, 1962-36 Int. Rev. Bull. 5. See notes 111-12 mipra and accompanying
text
148. See 356 U.S. at 28-29.
149. Thus, § 4422 of the 1954 Code explicitly provides that the payment of the wager-
ing tax does not authorize the carrying on of any business in violation of a law of the
United States or the law of any state. Ixr. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 4422.
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while all other business would be taxable on the basis of net income .... 0190
This is hardly an adequate ground for decision, since disallowance of any
business expenditures by reason of public policy results pro tanto in a tax on
gross income. But this language, especially when read with the language in
Tank Truck calling for an accommodation between the congressional intent
to tax net income and the presumption against an intent to encourage viola-
tions, does indicate that an awareness that a contrary result would have in-
volved approval of a tax on the gross income of gambling businesses figured
large among the actual considerations that led to allowance of the bookmaker's
expenses.
A contrary holding in Sullivan would have had far reaching effects on the
distribution of power between the federal and state governments over gambling
and other illegal businesses.5 1 Voluntary compliance with a tax on the gross
income of gambling enterprises-under rates which are proportioned to net in-
come, i.e., a taxpayer's actual increase in wealth during an accounting period-
is not likely. Thus, assuming a gross income tax based on present rates, a busi-
ness with a gross income of $50,000 and actual business expenses of $20,000,
would be left with approximately $3,000 after-tax-income. The function of the
tax therefore would be to enable federal authorities to prosecute such busi-
nesses for income tax evasion and avoidance. There are many possible rea-
sons why the Court would not approve this change in the administration of the
federal and state criminal systems. Since the precise elements of the offenses
of gambling and lotteries frequently vary from state to state, the Court might
well regard these crimes as primarily matters of local concern. 15 2 Moreover,
it has been alleged that the federal enforcement of local laws tends to free
the states from a sense of responsibility for their own conditions. To the
extent that gamblers are prosecuted for tax evasion instead of gambling, state
150. 356 U.S. at 29.
151, Recent opinions show that the Supreme Court was well aware of redistribution
of criminal jurisdiction effected through the income tax laws and of the undesirable effects of
federal government intervention into the areas of the criminal law traditionally reserved
to the states. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 230, 240-42 (1961) (dissent by Mr.
Justice Blaclk joined by Mr. Justice Douglas) ; Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 139-47
(1951) (dissent by Mr. Justice Black, with whom Justices Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas
concurred).
152. The Senate Crime Committee stated in its Third Interim Report:
Any program for controlling organized crime must take into account the fundamental
nature of our governmental system. The enforcement of the criminal law is primarily
a State and local responsibility.
S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951).
And Attorney General Mitchell commented:
Experience has shown that when Congress enacts criminal legislation of this type
the tendency is for the State authorities to cease their efforts toward punishing the
offenders and to leave it to the Federal authorities and Federal courts. That has been
the experience under the Dyer Act.
72 CONG. REc. 6214 (1930). The two excerpts above were quoted in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Black in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 142 nn,2, 3 (1952).
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courts are deprived of the opportunity to use the discretion vested in them
by local legislatures to impose sanctions in accordance with the goals and
ideas of the local community. Similarly, state prosecutors are deprived of the
important function of deciding which local offenders should be prosecuted.15t
Although the national government's invasion of areas of crime control
traditionally reserved to the states is not unknown, such national in-
terventions have generally rested upon specific congressional enactments.
Furthermore, most of these national enactments are not designed directly to
suppress activities illegal under state law, but to assist state enforcement
agencies in the administration of their own statutes. Thus, such excise mea-
sures as the narcotics 'r and wagering taxes 1" are used as devices for
securing publicity of transactions in order to aid the states in the execution of
their police powers. In contrast to a gross income tax, these measures do not
establish primary federal jurisdiction over activities illegal by virtue of state
law. 56 Finally, the Court might also consider the extent to which the IRS,
an agency ostensibly devoted to the problems of raising revenue, is suited to
assume the duties of enforcing the criminal laws outside the tax field.
CONCLUSION
Related to one's view of a proper balance between state and national
authority is the constitutional question presented by a tax on the gross income
of an illegal business: the power to tax gross income at today's income tax
rates, if sanctioned by the Court, would permit the national government to
accomplish by taxation almost everything that the states may accomplish in
the field of criminal law by the exercise of their police power.'6 7 Of course, if
153. See Schwartz, Federal Criminal turisdiclion and Proscculors' Discrelion, 13 L~w
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 64, 83-86 (1948).
154. xT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4701-07, 4711-16, 4721-26, 4731-36, 4741-46, 4751-57,
4761-62, 4771-76.
155. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4401-04,4411-13, 4421-23.
156. For a discussion of "amdliary" federal criminal jurisdiction, see generally,
Schwartz, supra note 153 at 70-87.
157. An interesting instance of the expansion of federal jurisdiction through the use
of the tax laws and the ingenuity of a federal court is presented by the probation proceedings
of Thomas Worcester. Thomas Worcester had participated in a well established and wide-
spread system of corruption of state officials connected with the award of public works
contracts in Massachusetts and was convicted by a federal district court of willful income
tax evasion for deducting bribes as ordinary business expenses. He was granted probation
upon a condition that, "He shall cooperate with, and give full, candid testimony to any
national, state, or local prosecutor, grand jury, petit jury, legislative body, legislative com-
mittee, or authorized public agency of inquiry concerning any matter directly or indirect-
ly relevant to those matters covered in trial. .. ." Upon a complaint by the United States
District Attorney that the probationer had not cooperated fully with a federal grand jury
investigation, the federal district court decided to hold a public revocation hearing to
determine whether the probationer had fully cooperated with the grand jury investigation.
At this hearing many persons implicated in the statewide bribery were called as witnesses
and the hearing generally served the purpose of implementing a state, albeit unenforced,
policy against corruption of local officials. Indeed, the federal judge holding the hearing
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an excise measure can be shown to be in substance an exercise of the taxing
power, its collateral effects on the conduct of taxpayers could not be adduced
to defeat its constitutionality; incidental regulation and control are inherently
and inextricably bound up with any exercise of the taxing power. The fact
situation in Sullivan, however, raises the question of whether demonstable
effects might not afford a sufficient basis for holding that what professes to
be a tax is in reality something else. The answer furnished by the Supreme
Court to date is extremely problematical.0 8 The Court on occasion has held a
monetary measure of Congress unconstitutional, the rationale being that a
federal excise, in form of tax, may in substance be a police regulation so
obviously unrelated to any fiscal enterprise as to fall outside the taxing
power. 159 More often the Court has approved highly dubious exercises of the
federal taxing power, invoking judicial inability to indulge in surmises con-
cerning the objects sought to be attained by lawmakers.'(*
Traditional judicial reluctance to inquire into the motives of the legislature
should not, however, foreclose examination of an exaction imposed upon the
gross income of gambling and lottery establishments, for the purpose of such
legislation can be ascertained with a fair degree of certainty without examining
the thoughts and desires of Congressmen. One principal disqualifying factor
which should lead a court to conclude that a purported excise is not a tax-
at least in the context of United States experience-is a showing that volun-
tary mass compliance with the excise is highly unlikely. Since the primary
purpose of a tax is to raise revenue, with regulation as an incidental effect,
the tax aspects of the measure are rather questionable if the inevitable conse-
quence of an excise is large scale evasion of the tax or abandonment of
the taxable activity. The other tests traditionally used to distinguish a tax from
a penalty seem relevant only as evidence of the necessary result of the excise.
Thus, an onerous or burdensome rate of taxation is indicative of a regulatory
purpose to the extent that abandonment of the taxable enterprise or evasion of
the tax is more likely than payment of the tax. When the criterion between tax-
ability and non-taxability is the illegality of an activity or business under local
law,i01 the conclusion that the measure is a penal one does not rest upon the
probable motives of Congress, but upon the assumption that the probable result
questioned the wisdom of using the federal tax laws and a probation revocation hearing
as a basis of federal jurisdiction in matters traditionally of state concern. United States
v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1961), application for Prerogative writ denied
sub nom. In re Callahan, 285 F2d 757 (1st Cir. 1960). For an able discussion of the
probation revocation hearing of Thomas Worcester, see Note, A Trial Judge's Freedomg
and Responsibility In Administering Probation, 71 YALE L.J. 551 (1962).
158. Compare United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), with United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
159. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S.
44(1922).
160. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) ; Sonzinsky v. United States,
300 U.S. 506 (1937) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
161. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
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of the so-called tax will be prosecutions for evasion of the measure rather than
compliance with it. Under this test, which avoids the problems inherent in the
ascertainment of "true" legislative motive, the determination that a tax on the
gross income of illegal businesses is primarily a regulatory, and only incidentally
a taxing, measure does not seem very difficult.
But the same considerations which apparently led the Court to allow the de-
ductions in Sullivan seem to apply in varying degrees to all expenditures dis-
allowed under the rubric of the public policy doctrine. When the Treasury disal-
lows expenditures of a taxpayer because they are illegal under state law, the same
regulatory purpose of suppressing unlawful activities and the same invasion of
state police power are present Similarly, the disallowance of fines and penalties,
as presently administered, involving as it does the imposition of a special tax on
such violations, represents an addition of the IRS and the federal courts to state
agencies in the punishment of violators of state, as well as federal, statutes.
In such areas, involving fact situations less extreme than that presented in
Sullivan, judicial applications of the criteria adumbrated above would necessar-
ily be fraught with difficulty. Thus, given the varied uses of taxing measures
and the difficulties involved in predicting their actual effects, decisions in such
situations would appear to be beyond the institutional capabilities of courts.
More important, the courts' only weapon in this area must necessarily be the
ultimate one of a finding of constitutional invalidity. And where, as in Tank"
Truck, the disallowed expenditures do not represent a very substantial propor-
tion of the enterprise's total disbursements and therefore a finding of a regulatory
purpose is more difficult, the disproportionate nature of such a response would in
all likelihood be determinative.
These considerations indicate the substantial limitations upon judicial capabil-
ity to police the use of tax laws for regulatory purposes on the basis of considera-
tions of federalism. Similarly, since the due process clause has not been con-
strued to limit the amount of exactions imposed under the taxing powerlc
constitutional arguments would appear to be unavailable in any situation where
penalties or expenditures which contravene federal statutes are disallowed.
But this is only to say that the resolution of the problems involved are left pri-
marily to the Congress. The question at issue is not limited to a conflict between
state and national jurisdiction, but rather concerns the inappropriateness of an
undiscriminating utilization of the income tax laws to enforce a multifarious
array of penal and regulatory statutes. And this basic difficulty remains the same
162. No tax has been held invalid under the Fifth Amendment because based on an
improper classification, and it is significant that in the entire one hundred and forty
years of its history the only taxes held condemned by the Fifth Amendment were those
deemed to be arbitrarily retroactive.
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 338 (1932) (dissent). See also Nichols v. Coolidge, 274
U.S. 531 (1927).
See Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person,
33 CoLtJ . L. REv. 791, 824 (1933), suggesting that valid due process objections to a taxing
measure might be limited to arbitrary and tyrannical situations.
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where the responsible authorities being superseded by the IRS are federal as well
as state agencies.
The various categories of expenditures disallowed under the public policy
rubric, of course, present different considerations and are therefore subject to
varied solutions. These solutions, however, must necessarily be partial ones.
The basic difficulty created by the disparities between the law and mechanics
of taxation and of penal and regulatory statutes remain relevant and indeed
central to them all.'0 3 In the final analysis, therefore, it is an appreciation of
this fundamental disparity which must serve as the point of departure for the
long overdue reformulation of the public policy exception to the allowance of
business expense deductions under the Internal Revenue Code.
163. There are other areas of the law in which prior antisocial behavior, already penal.
ized under another statute or excused sub silentio by enforcement agencies, is taken into ac.
count in denying privileges or benefits: e.g., laws governing the granting of licenses, natural'
ization statutes, habitual criminal statutes, probation and presentence procedures, and voting
laws. While a discussion of these laws is beyond the scope of this Comment, it may be sug-
gested that at least some of the sanctions imposed under these laws are, theoretically at least,
reasonably related to the objects of the statutes involved. Thus, past criminal behavior seeing
relevant to a determination of good moral character for purposes of naturalization proceed-
ings. Where past criminal or antisocial behavior is not so related, similar problems con-
cerning excessive sanctions imposed by an authority not primarily responsible for enforce-
ment of the statute proscribing such conduct are raised.
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